This article analyses the determinants that lead national courts across EU countries to use the preliminary reference procedure, paying special attention to the differences and similarities in the use of this mechanism of judicial cooperation between the old and the 
Introduction
In the last couple of decades, the literature has developed diverse explanations to account for how national judges' preferences and national institutional structures encourage the legal integration of Europe by means of Article 267 TFEU (Alter, 1996 (Alter, , 1998 (Alter, , 2008 Burley and Mattli, 1993; Carrubba and Murrah, 2005; Mattli and Slaughter, 1998b, 1998a; Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998; Stone Sweet, 2004; Weiler, 1994; Vink et al., 2009; Wind et al., 2009; Wind, 2010; Hurnef and Voigt, 2012) . Scholars tried to assess whether legal and political institutional factors can explain why the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) received more preliminary rulings from some Member States of the EU than from others. Until recently, the interest in the study of preliminary references made by national courts from new Member States has been limited, with some exceptions (see Kühn, 2006; Sadurski, 2008; Hurner and Voigt, 2012) , due to their only recent incorporation into the EU and, consequently, the poor involvement of their national courts in the preliminary reference procedure established by Article 267 TFEU (ex-Article 234 TEC).
Nevertheless, this situation has, since recently, changed as new Member States have started to cooperate with the CJEU, to the extent of equaling or even surpassing the number of references sent by old Member States' courts. From one year to another, in some of these Member States from Central and Eastern Europe (henceforth CEE) the number of references requested has doubled or tripled. But despite the increasing judicial cooperation between the CJEU and new members' courts, little is known so far about the impact of legal and political institutions on the use of the preliminary references procedure by CEE courts as compared to the older members. This raises new questions related to the judicial behavior of national courts of new Member States, such as: 1) to what extent may the trends in the use of preliminary references in new member states be explained by the same institutional factors accounting for its use in older ones (e.g. dualism, judicial review of legislation, years of membership, among others); and, what is more important, 2) is there any specific institutional effect characterizing the preliminary references procedure within
CEE?
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This article seeks to complement previous contributions on the institutional analysis of preliminary references by offering an assessment of the rationales for the involvement of national courts in newer Member States compared to older ones. This assessment will help to lift the "iron legal curtain" dulling our understanding of the use of preliminary references within newer Members States and shed some light on the common and similar factors driving the use of adjudication in both groups of Member States. For that purpose I will present comprehensive data on the use of preliminary references 
in all 27
Member States (MS). The article is organized as follows: in the next section I briefly describe the historical pattern in the use of preliminary references in new and old Member
States. The second section describes the main explanatory factors accounting for the use of preliminary references. The third section describes the research design and data used for the empirical analysis in section four, before the article ends in a conclusion.
A descriptive assessment of the use of preliminary references in older and newer Member States
The literature on European judicial politics has explained the increasing relevance of preliminary references (PR) and its variation across EU countries since 1961 (see Figure 1) , considering temporal as well as country-related explanations. Source: CJEU statistics on judicial activity -http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7032/ As was said before, the inclusion of new Member States from CEE, as a separate group of analysis, has been missing due to their only recent integration and their poor involvement in the preliminary reference procedure. However, that situation has changed. source: CJEU statistics on judicial activity -http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7032/ That situation becomes even more evident by looking at the differences in the use of preliminary references across countries through controlling for the number of years (see Figure 3 ). After controlling for temporal effects, we can better appreciate the large heterogeneity among the EU-27 countries and, what is more interesting, detect clear differences within the "new members" group. With regards to the effects of this differentiation on the preliminary references made by national courts, on one hand, several scholars argue that national courts in monist legal system are more willing to apply EU law, especially when they suspect EU law to contradict the principles of their national legal systems. As a result of their greater willingness and experience with international law and instruments, national courts from monist contexts will rely more often on supranational adjudication than courts in dualist systems (Alter, 1996; Hornuf and Voigt, 2012 
Counter-limits to EU law
National constitutional and supreme courts in several Member States have established reservations to the supremacy doctrine -like in the Solange case I in Germany -and, by extension, also to EU law reception, in order to preserve the autonomy of their national constitutional and legal order (Martinico, 2012) . These reservations have allowed higher courts to retain for themselves the right to review whether European Union institutionsmainly the CJEU -act within the competences conferred upon them and in respect of fundamental national constitutional norms (Albi, 2007) . In such contexts, national courts will try to prevent the intervention of European institutions beyond their national limits and, in addition, to avoid the reversal of their decisions by higher courts when they apply EU law beyond its national limits. Hence,
:
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The role of higher courts within the multi-level judicial architecture
Following Article 267 TFEU and the CILFIT doctrine II , higher (non-constitutional) courts, as last instance courts, have the obligation to call for preliminary references when they have serious doubts about the application of EU law. Hence, we should expect an increase in the amount of preliminary references as the number of higher courts growths (Hornuf and Voigt, 2012) . Ramos Romeu (2006) and Kornhauser (1992a Kornhauser ( , 1992b reinforce this argument by indicating how higher courts, as judicial bodies specialized on legal
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interpretation, are more likely to receive and address complex EU law issues. So, they will request the intervention of the CJEU to solve complex doctrinal conflicts in case they cannot do it by themselves in applying the doctrine of acte claire. Moreover, Ramos identifies that references are costly and require a lot of time and effort from lower courts, which are not always equipped with the resources needed for this task. Otherwise, higher courts -due to more legal resources -are more willing to be involved in preliminary references. All together, that is: the obligation coming from Article 267 TFEE and CILFIT, the complexity of EU law cases addressed to higher courts, and the number of resources available for sending preliminary references, make higher courts more willing to cooperate with the CJEU than ordinary courts. As a result, we would expect more recourse to the use of preliminary references as the number of higher courts increases: 
Judicial review of legislation powers
On the one hand, legalistic explanations argue that judges already entitled with judicial review power of legislation are more likely to send preliminary references (Alter, 1996 (Alter, , 1998 Stone and Brunell, 1998; Mattli and Slaughter, 1998; Carruba and Murrah, 2006) . So, courts familiar with the power to preclude the application of national law will easily accept the chance to send preliminary references and declare national law null as a natural extension of their national pre-existing judicial powers. On the other hand, political accounts, assuming that ordinary judges are willing to increase their judicial power vis-à-vis other national institutions, emphasize the fact that national judges without the power of judicial review of legislation cooperate with the CJEU to legitimate the exercise of their newly conferred review powers against their national highest courts, like constitutional courts, who may try to circumvent their authority (Tridimas & Tridimas, 2004; Vink et al., 2009; Hornuf and Voigt, 2012 
Common Law
European countries with a common law tradition are attached to the general rule of binding precedent more than countries with other legal traditions (e.g. civil law, Scandinavian law, etc.). Judges socialized in this culture will be more aware of and used to the usage of CJEU precedents, and hence make less use of preliminary references.
Similarly, Hornuf and Voigt (2012) 
Research Design: Data and method
This section describes the data sources, variables and statistical technique used to test the hypotheses presented above. The data set includes information on preliminary references IV (dependent variable) and other legal and political factors (independent or explanatory variables) of EU Member States from 1961 until 2011. For the analysis I estimate a linear panel regression with random effects for the number of referrals sent to the CJEU by country. The selection of a random-effects model was determined by some variables for which within-cluster variation is minimal over time.
Next, I offer a description of the coding of the explanatory variables used in the analysis to test the hypotheses. Furthermore, I have included several "control variables"
that are non-related to legal and political institutions but which, according to the literature, may affect the use of preliminary references, like population or years of membership.
-Dualism is a dummy variable that achieves the value of 1 if a Member State has a dualist legal system and 0 otherwise. Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License
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Control variables
-Population: Member states with a large population should tend to litigate more and, as a result, will send more preliminary references (Stone and Brunell, 1998). The variable was transformed to its logged value. Source: Eurostat, accessed August 2012.
-Years of membership measures the duration of EU membership of a country. This variable is used as a proxy for the experience of national courts with EU legal instruments and their acquaintance with PR proceedings. More experience makes it more likely that a court will send preliminary references to the CJEU (Ramos, 2006) . Table 1 lists some of the descriptives for the variables detailed above. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Empirical Findings
As regards the results for the EU-27 (see models 1 and 2), and taking as a reference the full model 2, the impact of the number of higher courts across years and countries is remarkable . The coefficients for this variable are significant at 5%, meaning that EU Member States refer 4.037 more preliminary rulings to the CJEU if the number of higher courts increases by one unit across time and/or between countries. This finding emphasizes the relevance of the engagement of higher courts within the preliminary reference procedure. Furthermore, we see how government capacity impacts significantly on the number of preliminary references within CEE countries: to have a government with a high transposition capacity has a negative effect on the use of preliminary references.
Contrariwise, national courts are more likely to send preliminary references in countries with low government capacity, i.e. states in which the problems of wrong implementation of EU legislation are more likely to occur, such as Romania and Bulgaria (Falkner and Treib, 2008; Trauner, 2009 ). This finding points out that courts not only ask for CJEU rulings with the intention to solve doubts about the application of EU law, but also to force government and administration to fully enforce their European obligations.
As regards other factors, the results show a strong and constant effect by the control variables throughout all models: the rate of preliminary references will be higher in member states with a larger population and more years of membership. Nevertheless, we can observe how the establishment of counter-limits by higher courts to preserve the autonomy of their national constitutional and legal order has no effect on the likelihood of using preliminary references. Finally, and finishing with new member states, the decreasing effect of support for the European Union (at 10% of significance) and, unlike expected, the positive impact of common law systems on the use of preliminary references must be emphasized.
Conclusions
In this article I have analysed the use of preliminary references in the EU-27 with the main aim of explaining institutional differences and similarities between old and new Member States leading to the activation of Article 267 TFEU by national judges. The results of the analysis do not reveal any common institutional dynamic influencing the behaviour of courts in their recourse to preliminary references. However, they suggest some differences in the judicial and political institutional dynamics driving the use of preliminary references within new and old Member States. While in the case of the EU-15 the use of preliminary references seems mainly to be influenced by the role played by higher courts and the inter-judicial competition between lower and higher courts, in CEE
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countries the main factors explaining the use of preliminary references are the dualist tradition of some countries, the previous experience of national courts with judicial review powers, and the incapacity of governments and administrations to successfully implement EU policies and legislation.
The findings of this article offer preliminary evidence on the similarities and differences between new and old Member States as regards the use of preliminary references. While the data on preliminary references suggests an increasing trend in the use of (annual) preliminary in CEE countries, this work also advocates the existence of some specific factors explaining the request of CJEU rulings on the other side of the "iron legal curtain".
Some of the factors in new Member States seem to be related to the recent integration of EU principles and norms within national legal orders and the adaptation capacity of political institutions to comply with EU legislation. Nevertheless, we can expect a reduction of the impact of dualism on the use of preliminary references as courts becomes more familiar with the application of EU law, as it has also happened in the EU-15. In addition, it has become quite clear that national courts are just as, if not more, important in newer Member States than in older ones in terms of policy-making, not least because of their relevance for improving the quality and correct judicial enforcement of EU law when national governments fail to correctly implement EU legislation at domestic level.
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